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Increasing inter-generational social mobility: is educational 
expansion the answer? 
 
Franz Buscha* and Patrick Sturgis** 
 
Abstract: Reforms which increase the stock of education in a society have long been 
held by policy-makers as key to improving rates of intergenerational social mobility.  Yet, 
despite the intuitive plausibility of this idea, the empirical evidence in support of an effect 
of educational expansion on social fluidity is both indirect and weak. In this paper we use 
the raising of the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 years in England and Wales 
in 1972 to estimate the effect of educational participation and qualification attainment on 
rates of intergenerational social class mobility. Because, in expectation, children born 
immediately before and after the policy was implemented are statistically exchangeable, 
the difference in the amount of education they received may be treated as exogenously 
determined. The exogenous nature of the additional education gain means that 
differences in rates of social mobility between cohorts affected by the reform can be 
treated as having been caused by the additional education. The data for the analysis come 
from the ONS Longitudinal Study, which links individual records from successive 
decennial censuses between 1971 and 2001. Our findings show that, although the reform 
resulted in an increase in educational attainment in the population as a whole and a 
weakening of the association between attainment and class origin, there was no reliably 
discernible increase in the rate of intergenerational social mobility.  
 
 
 
Keywords: social mobility; education; census; inter-generational; cohorts; 
England.  
 
 
* University of Westminster, London, NW1 5LS, Email: F.Buscha@westminster.ac.uk 
** University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, Email: P.Sturgis@soton.ac.uk   
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
The level of intergenerational social mobility in a society is widely taken as a yardstick of 
its fairness and equality, outwardly signalling whether citizens achieve social and 
economic status through hard work and ability, or as a result of advantages bestowed 
upon them by their parents. The compelling argument that increasing social and 
economic fluidity between generations makes a society fairer is girded by a more 
instrumental economic discourse;  that the allocation of individuals to occupations on the 
basis of merit is a more efficient use of the available ‘talent pool’. In a socially fluid 
society, therefore, jobs will be filled by individuals possessing the most suitable attributes 
to undertake them, with higher levels of economic output and productivity accruing as a 
result. By implication, then, increasing social mobility should yield benefits, not only for 
deserving individuals but for society as a whole (Heath 1981; Payne 1987; Swift 2004).  
Thus it is that social mobility has become the key motif of the current political 
epoch, with politicians on both left and right in the UK now championing it as a core 
policy objective. The prominence of social mobility as an issue of contemporary public 
and political debate is well illustrated by the fact that between 2008 and 2012 alone, six 
government or parliamentary reports were published on the subject (Saunders 2012) and 
many more made direct reference to it as a subsidiary policy objective. The Labour 
governments of 1997 to 2010 were the first to place social mobility at the centre of their 
policy programme, encapsulating as the notion of social mobility did, New Labour’s 
emphasis on equality of opportunity rather than outcomes, and justifying the substantial 
investment in educational expansion, particularly, though not exclusively in the tertiary 
sector (Goldthorpe 2012).  The centrality of social mobility as a guiding theme driving 
policy reform has, if anything, strengthened under the current government, with an 
explicit statement that improving intergenerational social mobility is its ‘principal social 
policy objective’ for the 2010 to 2015 parliament (HM Government 2011a).  
In both academic and policy spheres, as well as amongst media commentators, 
education is seen as fundamental to achieving the apparently consensual goal of 
increasing social mobility (Ishida Müller and Ridge 1995).  For example, thirteen of the 
seventeen indicators drawn up by the government to monitor short to medium term 
progress in increasing social mobility, are measures of educational attainment across the 
life-cycle (HM Government 2011a).  Similarly, much of the rationale and justification for 
educational policy reform is framed around narratives of improving social mobility. The 
increase in the minimum age of participation in education and training to seventeen in 
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2013 (and to eighteen by 2015), for instance, is described in a Department of Education 
strategy document as ‘central to our ambitions to improve social mobility’ (HM 
Government 2011b: 2).  This emphasis on the key role of educational expansion in 
increasing social mobility is based on two linked empirical regularities; educational 
attainment is highly predictive of socio-economic achievement (Breen et al. 2009; Hunt 
and McIntosh 2007; Walker and Zhu 2013) and socio-economic origin is highly 
predictive of educational attainment (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Goodman et al 2009; 
Blanden and Machin 2010). Eliding these two robust associations into a single 
mechanism leads to the intuitively appealing inference that public policy must focus on 
weakening the link between socio-economic origins and educational achievement, if 
social mobility is to be increased.  
 However, the idea that increasing the stock of education in a society will enhance 
intergenerational mobility must accommodate an apparent empirical paradox (Boudon 
1974); despite major expansion in the mass education system during the twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, social fluidity in the UK appears hardly to have changed at all 
(Goldthorpe and Mills 2004; Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007; Paterson and Ianelli 2007) 
and may actually have declined somewhat on some measures (Blanden et al. 2004). And 
while the exact trend in post-war social mobility in the UK remains a source of some 
disagreement (Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan 2013; Goldthorpe 2012; Lambert, Prandy 
and Bottero 2007), one thing at least seems evident; there has not been an increase in 
social fluidity commensurate with what might be expected given the scope of educational 
reform and expansion during the period under examination (Saunders 2010; Breen 2010). 
Be that as it may, however, the very broad time frame over which this comparison 
between social mobility and educational expansion has been made, as well as the rather 
indirect nature of the contrast, means that little is currently understood about whether 
and how specific educational reforms have affected social mobility in the past. Nor, as a 
consequence, do we adequately understand how policies might best be designed and 
implemented to achieve this objective in the future. 
 Our objective in this paper is, therefore, to shed light on the question of whether 
policies which are intended to increase the stock of education in a society impact on rates 
of intergenerational social mobility.  Specifically we estimate the effect of the raising of 
the statutory minimum school leaving age in 1972 from 15 to 16 years in England and 
Wales on educational attainment and, subsequently, on rates of social mobility.  Although 
the effects of this policy change have already been studied extensively in economics, our 
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research makes two important and novel contributions. First, while existing studies have 
used variation in the statutory school leaving age to estimate the causal effect of 
education on employment propensity and earnings in adulthood, we assess for the first 
time whether it had a discernible effect on intergenerational social class mobility. Second, 
while existing studies have estimated population average effects of the change in the 
school leaving age on educational attainment, our analysis is the first to decompose the 
observed effects by the socio-economic origins of those affected by the policy change.  
This is an important innovation, because it seems unlikely that the effect of the reform 
would have been experienced uniformly across the distribution of socio-economic origin 
states. We might anticipate, for instance, that the education gain would be smallest for 
those from more advantaged backgrounds, because the majority of this group would 
have stayed at school beyond their fifteenth birthday anyway. And, by the same token, 
any effects that are observed should be expected to be more substantial amongst those 
from less materially advantaged backgrounds, because a larger proportion of this group 
would have left school at a younger age if the policy had not been introduced.  Whether 
the educational reform had this kind of asymmetric effect is of interest in its own right. 
However, it is particularly germane to an assessment of whether the reform resulted in an 
increase in social fluidity. This is because an educational reform should only be expected 
to have this effect if it equalizes educational attainment between groups from different 
social class origins, or if it changes the composition of social class groups achieving 
qualifications that differ in the strength of the intergenerational class association (Breen 
2010). 
 
2. Social class mobility and the role of education  
Although political and media attention to social mobility is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon, empirical analysis of intergenerational class inequality dates back to the 
1950s, when David Glass carried out the first nationally-representative study of 
occupation-based mobility trends over the first half of the twentieth century (Glass 1954).  
The evidence from the 1949 survey on which this study was based showed that class 
mobility had remained more or less constant, despite the significant changes that had 
taken place in the education system and the broader social structure during this period. 
This finding was strongly counter to expectations at the time, because the research was 
undertaken not long after the implementation of the 1944 Education Act, which had 
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been intended and widely anticipated to improve the life chances of those from less 
advantaged backgrounds.  
 Subsequent work by John Goldthorpe and other sociologists in the 1980s 
showed that an increase in mobility had taken place in the thirty years following the end 
of World War II (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne 1980; Heath 1981; Goldthorpe and 
Payne 1986). The rapid expansion of professional and managerial occupations that the 
UK experienced as it evolved from an agricultural and manufacturing society towards a 
service-based economy resulted in rapid growth in non-manual occupations, producing 
‘more room at the top’ and, therefore, a substantial increase in upward mobility over time. 
It is important to distinguish here, however, between absolute and relative measures of 
social mobility.  Absolute mobility is the simple difference between an individual’s socio-
economic position in adulthood and that of his or her parents when the individual was a 
child (usually taken at age 14). Absolute mobility makes no adjustment for structural 
change in an economy over time and, thus, will necessarily change if the ratio of middle 
to working class jobs in an economy alters, as was the case in Britain and most western 
democracies in the middle part of the twentieth century (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and 
Payne 1987). Relative mobility, in contrast, adjusts for changes in the occupational 
composition of an economy over time, yielding measures which denote the relative 
chances of different socio-economic destinations across the distribution of origin states. 
In conventional social mobility analysis in the sociological tradition, relative mobility is 
assessed by taking ratios of odds in cross-tabulations of origin and destination social class 
groups (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1985; Breen 2010). This enables an expression of the 
relative chances of moving between different social class groups, conditioning on 
changes in the marginal distribution of the origin and destination states across periods 
(Goodman 1978; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992).  
Goldthorpe and colleagues showed that, although absolute mobility had 
increased in the post war decades, relative mobility had hardly changed at all, or at least 
not in a way that could be characterised as approximating a linear trend, the so-called 
constant flux pattern (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Thus, despite major changes to the 
educational system, the social class structure, and the industrial composition of the UK 
economy, the chances of children from disadvantaged backgrounds moving into 
managerial and professional occupations, relative to their more advantaged 
contemporaries, remained essentially unaltered. Although hampered by a scarcity of 
suitable data sets containing the necessary variables for mobility analysis, subsequent 
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investigations have found that this basic pattern continued into the later decades of the 
twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, though with some 
indication of a slight increase in relative mobility and a decrease in absolute mobility 
(Golthorpe and Mills 2008; Li and Devine 2011). 
An important implication of approaching social mobility from a relative rather 
than an absolute perspective is that, for educational expansion to alter the association 
between class origin and destination states, the increase in educational attainment must 
be differential across the distribution of origin states. This is because it is not ‘absolute’ 
educational attainment that determines one’s position in the occupational hierarchy but 
where one stands in the ranking of educational achievement. Thus, if the amount of 
additional education introduced by a policy intervention is experienced uniformly across 
the population, then no change in the educational ranking will have occurred and social 
mobility will be unaffected. If, however, the policy change succeeds in reducing the 
strength of the association between social class origin and educational attainment then 
equalization will have occurred and social fluidity might be expected to increase as a 
result (Breen and Jonsson 2005; Breen 2010).  
A second way in which fluidity can be increased through educational expansion is 
when a policy reform has the effect of shifting individuals from less advantaged 
backgrounds into educational attainment levels at which the association between class 
origins and destinations is weaker than at lower levels of attainment (Hout 1988). For 
instance, if a policy change has the effect of increasing the proportion of adults from 
working class backgrounds with degrees, and the association between origin and 
destination states is weaker for graduates than for non-graduates, then this policy should, 
ceteris paribus, have the effect of increasing social fluidity.  
 
3. The Raising of the School Leaving Age  
The statutory school leaving age has been increased twice in England and Wales since the 
Second World War, in 1947 and 1972. The Education Act of 1944 increased the 
minimum age at which children could legally exit the school system from 14 to 15 on the 
1st of April 1947.  The 1944 Act also gave future governments the power to raise the 
school leaving age by a further year, to 16, as soon as it was deemed practicable to do so 
(Education Act, 1944). Following a long hiatus, this was implemented in 1971 and, from 
September 1972, all children attending school in England and Wales were required to 
stay on until the age of 16.i The 1972 Raising of the School Leaving Age (RoSLA), in 
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principle at least, therefore affected all individuals born on or after 1 September 1957. 
Anyone born after this date was legally required to receive a minimum of eleven years of 
schooling, while those born before it were subject to a minimum of ten years. The 
national coverage of the school system in England and Wales means that these changes 
were implemented with no regional or temporal variation, in contrast to similar changes 
enacted within the education systems in the United States and other countries.ii 
The analytical appeal of RoSLA events is that they induce an exogenous increase 
in the quantity of education received by a population and so the estimated effects of the 
additional education on other outcomes can be interpreted as causal (Angrist and 
Krueger 1991; Harmon and Walker 1995). The increase in education following a RoSLA 
event can be considered exogenous because it is not subject to individual choice. Rather, 
it is determined solely by whether an individual was born before or after the date which 
determines school cohort allocation in the year the policy was implemented. Because it is 
very unlikely that this assignment rule (date of birth relative to school cohort assignment 
date) is itself directly causally related to later life outcomes such as employment status, 
social class, and earnings, it can be used to identify the causal effect of the additional 
education on these outcomes (Harmon and Walker 1995; Devereux and Hart 2010; 
Grenet, 2013).   
In the UK, Harmon and Walker (1995) estimated a 15 percent increase in hourly 
earnings for each additional year of education. Subsequent studies supported the 
conclusion that the RoSLAs in England and Wales significantly increased the amount of 
schooling undertaken and that this additional education resulted in an increased 
probability of being in employment (Dickson and Smith 2011), and of higher hourly 
earnings (Oreopoulos 2006; Grenet 2013; Devereux and Hart 2010) in adulthood. Non-
economic outcomes were also affected by the 1972 RoSLA, with evidence showing a 
reduced probability of teenage pregnancy (Wilson 2012), better self-reported health (Siles 
2009) and a reduced probability of criminal conviction (Machin et al. 2011), although null 
results have also been reported for self-reported health (Clark and Royer 2010) and 
voting (Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos 2004).  
While the evidence seems clear, then, that these policy changes increased the 
stock of education undertaken by the population as a whole, no existing study has been 
able to examine whether the magnitude of the increase differed according to the socio-
economic origin of the individuals affected by the policy change. In large part, this is 
because the data sets used for estimating these effects contain no information about the 
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socio-economic origins of the cohorts affected by the reforms. As we noted earlier, 
though, it seems unlikely that the effects would be entirely uniform, because a 
disproportionate number of children from more advantaged backgrounds would likely 
have stayed at school until or beyond their sixteenth birthday in the absence of the 
reform. Concomitantly, it seems probable that those from the least advantaged 
backgrounds, who were most likely to leave school at 15 prior to the reform, would 
benefit the most.  In the following section, we describe how the data source that we use 
in this study enables us to evaluate whether the effect of the 1972 RoSLA was 
asymmetric across socio-economic origin states, as well as whether it affected the social 
class destinations of those affected by the reform.  
 
4. Data and measures 
We use the Office of National Statistics Longitudinal Study (LS). The LS is a 1 percent 
sample of the population of England and Wales, with individual records linked across 
successive censuses between 1971 and 2001iii. The LS was initially created from the 1971 
and 1981 censuses by selecting all individuals born on one of four (undisclosed) birth 
dates and linking records across years at the individual level.  This procedure has been 
repeated at each subsequent census, using the same four birth dates, with the records for 
the same individuals linked across years and new members joining if they are born, or 
have emigrated to England and Wales from another country, since the previous census. 
Data linkage ceases if a study member dies or emigrates from England and Wales. The 
LS thus provides representative cross-sectional and longitudinal information about the 
population of England and Wales for the years 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001.  
The LS has a number of advantages over other potential data sources for our 
purposes here. First, it has an extremely large sample size, with 289,335 individuals 
present in both the 1971 (as children) and 2001 (as adults) waves. Second, due to the 
census’ high rates of compliance and linkage rates of approximately 95 percent from one 
census to the next, it has excellent coverage of the target population. And third, it is 
possible to link the census records of all other individuals who were enumerated in the 
LS member’s household to the LS member’s records. This so-called ‘non-member’ 
information is a key feature of our analysis because it can be used to derive a high-quality 
measure of the socio-economic origin of LS members, via the occupation of co-resident 
parents recorded when the LS members were children. The ability to link records within 
households means that it is not necessary to rely on the potentially error-prone 
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recollections of adult respondents about what their parents’ occupations were decades 
earlier, as is usually required in studies of intergenerational class mobility. We use the 
occupation of LS members’ fathers to derive our measure of socio-economic origin. 
Where the father was not in employment, or where a father is not present in the 
household, we take the mother’s occupation instead. 
This approach means that parental information for 2001 LS members is only 
available for those who were co-resident with at least one parent at the time of the 1971 
census. The rate of missing parental information therefore increases substantially for 
2001 LS members who were 16 or above in 1971, as this is the age at which people 
generally begin to leave home. Our data shows that parental occupation is available for 
over 96 percent of LS members born after 1954 (which corresponds to being aged 16 or 
younger in 1971) and that the rate of missing parental information rises rapidly for 
individuals born prior to this date. The mean age of the parents of the LS members who 
were born during this period was 42.8 (44.3 for fathers and 41.8 for mothers) and the 
mean age of the LS members in 2001 was 44.  The fact that both LS members and their 
parents were in their forties at the time their occupations were observed means we can 
be confident that our estimates of intergenerational mobility should not be adversely 
affected by observing occupation at too early, or too late a point in the life course (Black 
and Devereux: 2010).  
 
Social class and status 
The theoretical and conceptual status of alternative measures of social class and status 
continue to be the source of disagreement within the social stratification literature 
(Bukodi, Dex, and Goldthorpe 2011). We do not seek to contribute to these debates here. 
Rather, we undertake the same analyses using both a categorical measure of social class 
and a continuous measure of social status. For the categorical measure of social class we 
use the Registrar General’s Social Class (RGSC) classification. iv  For the continuous 
measure of social status, we use the Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification 
(CAMSIS) scale (Prandy and Lambert 2003). Due to limitations of space, we present 
results for CAMSIS only because using a continuous measure of socio-economic 
position means that we are able to use linear rather than a logistic link function, which 
makes presentation and interpretation of results more parsimonious. However, the 
findings are substantively unaltered when using loglinear models fitted to RGSC. Results 
for the RGSC analyses are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
 10 
 
CAMSIS is derived from a multiple correspondence analysis of cross-classified tables 
representing the occupations of individuals and their spouses, or cohabiting partners. 
The cells of this table represent the frequency of marriage/partnership between different 
occupational unit groups taken from the standard occupational coding classification. The 
data used to produce the CAMSIS scale are taken from the decennial census, via the 
Sample of Anonymised Records (SARs). The large sample size of the SARs means that 
the full 3 digit standard occupational unit group coding can be used to produce a more 
fine-grained measure than would be possible using a data set with fewer observations.  
New CAMSIS scales are derived for each census year to take into account the 
changing nature of occupational prestige over time. CAMSIS is an inherently relative 
measure of socio-economic position because it is not possible for the total stock of 
occupational prestige in a society to change over time, only the relative ranking of 
individuals and occupations within the status hierarchy. To make CAMSIS more readily 
comparable cross-nationally and over time, it is rescaled so that the mean for the 
population is set to 50, with a minimum of 0, a maximum of 100, and a standard 
deviation of 15. CAMSIS is strongly correlated with a range of important indicators of 
social and material advantage, such as earnings, education, health, job satisfaction, and 
political engagement (Blanden et al 2009).  
 
Educational Attainment 
The UK education system at the time of the 2001 census required a minimum of 11 years 
of schooling. Children started primary school at age 5 and continued until the end of 
lower secondary school at age 16. An additional (non-compulsory) two years of 
schooling could then be pursued in preparation for A level examinations, which are the 
standard requirement for entry into higher education in England and Wales. Alternatively, 
following completion of compulsory education at age 16, individuals could pursue a 
range of vocational qualifications at colleges of Further Education, generally lasting for 
one or two years.  
In the 2001 Census, respondents were asked to indicate which of 12 academic 
and professional qualification levels they had achieved. These qualification indicators 
were then converted to a highest qualification variable according to the 2001 National 
Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) framework (QCA, 2001), as set out in Table I. The 
NVQ framework is based on occupational standard competencies for a given job role. At 
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its core the NVQ framework replicates the previously outlined educational stages of 
upper and lower secondary school and higher education.  
 
TABLE I HERE 
 
Analysis  
To assess how the 1972 RoSLA affected educational attainment we define the following 
multinomial logistic regression (McFadden 1973): 
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where j are the previously mentioned education categories,  is the highest 
qualification obtained in 2001 for LS member i,  is the CAMSIS score of the 
parent of LS member i in 1971, is a dummy variable indicating whether LS 
member i was born after 31 August 1957 and  is the interaction of the 
birth date dummy and parental CAMSIS score in 1971.  is a vector of covariates with 
coefficients , which in this case are parental age in 1971 and Government Office 
Region. 𝛽1 captures the effect of social origin on a child’s educational attainment, change 
in educational attainment due to the raising of the school leaving age is captured by , 
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whilst  identifies whether change in educational attainment due to the raising of the 
school leaving age varied according to the social origin of the LS member.  
We can use the same general approach to estimate the effect of the 1972 
education reform on intergenerational mobility by estimating, via ordinary least squares, 
the following expression: 
 
 0 1 2 3Child Parent Policy Policy Parenti i i i i i iY Y ED ED Y           x    (3) 
 
Here , which is the CAMSIS score for LS member i in 2001, replaces educational 
attainment as the outcome in equations (1) and (2).  now captures the effect of 
RoSLA on the conditional intergenerational CAMSIS correlation between parents and 
children and
 
 gauges the extent to which change in the intergenerational CAMSIS 
correlation due to RoSLA differed across the distribution of socio-economic origin states. 
Because specification of a linear interaction in  (or ) is unnecessarily restrictive, we 
transform  into quintile groups and include these as dummy variables in the 
regression where the omitted variable is quintile group 5 (those in the ‘best off’ quintile).v 
Where our specification includes dummy variables the effect of  is split over four 
parameters with one parameter acting as the reference parameter. In either case, the 
interpretation of these parameters remains the same; they measure the extent to which 
the raising of the school leaving age reform differentially affected children from different 
social origins conditional on their origin group.   
These two models could, in principle, be combined to produce an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimate using a structural model, where the IV estimate is the ratio of the 
reduced form coefficients in equations (1), (2) and (3). However, this approach is 
complicated by the non-linear link function that is used in models (1) and (2), where 
education is measured as a categorical variable whilst CAMIS is measured as a 
continuous variable (Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand 2007). We limit our an analysis 
to the two cohorts on either side of the 1972 discontinuity; LS members born in 1955 
and 1956 are coded 0 in the dummy while those born in 1958 and 1959 are 
given the value 1. We also exclude all those born in 1957 to rule out the possibility of 
confounding due to within cohort educational differences.vi  The idea that the children 
born either side of the date the policy change was implemented are, in statistical terms, 
3
Child
iY
2
3
3 3
Parent
iY
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Policy
iED
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‘exchangeable’ becomes less plausible the further birth dates are from the school census 
date. Taking the 1972 RoSLA as an example, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
group of children born on the 31st of August 1957 are, in expectation, no different in 
their probability of various future social and economic outcomes, compared to the group 
who were born a day later. Thus, if we observe a difference between these two groups on 
a later outcome, we can be confident that it results from the different amounts of 
education that the two groups received as a result of the policy change. However, as the 
birth dates which define the ‘before’ and ‘after’ groups move further in time from the 1st 
September discontinuity, the exchangeability assumption becomes less plausible because 
the possibility of confounding due to macro-level events and life-cycle factors increases. 
In the current context, a ‘bandwidth’ of two years on either side of the education 
discontinuity provides an optimal trade-off between proximity to the educational reform 
and precision of estimates. Sensitivity tests using bandwidths of 1 and 3 years showed 
very similar results and do not materially alter our conclusions. Results for these 
specifications can be found in the appendix. 
 
6. Results 
We begin by presenting visual depictions of the effect of the 1972 RoSLA on educational 
attainment. Figure I plots, by year of birth, the proportion of adults in the 2001 census 
born between 1950 and 1970 who reported a) no formal qualifications (grey lines) and b) 
one or more GCSE/O’ levels as their highest qualification (green lines). The dashed red 
vertical line represents the point at which the school leaving age was increased from 15 
to 16. Two things are immediately apparent from Figure I. First, the CAMSIS origin 
quintile groups differ substantially in their level of educational attainment, both before 
and after the school leaving age was increased. And second, all quintile groups 
experienced increases in their educational attainment following the reform. The 
proportion with no qualifications dropped notably after the reform in all groups, while 
the proportion with at least one GCSE/O-level increased concomitantly. Additionally, 
and importantly, the magnitude of the increase in educational attainment differs across 
the quintile groups; individuals from origin quintiles 2 and 3 exhibit larger increases 
compared to those at the top and the bottom of the origin distribution. Those in quintile 
5 (the most advantaged backgrounds) show the smallest increase in qualifications 
following the reform. 
 
 14 
FIGURE I HERE 
 
Figure 1, then, shows that the 1972 RoSLA significantly increased the stock of 
education in the population as a whole. That this was the case, however, was already 
well-known from the existing literature (Dickson and Harmon 2011). What Figure I 
shows for the first time is that the impact of the reform differed as a function of the 
socio-economic background of those affected by it. Those in the middle of the socio-
economic origin distributionvii experienced the most substantial increase in qualification 
attainment, while those at the top experienced the least.  This pattern accords with our a 
priori expectation that a high proportion of children from socio-economically 
advantaged households would be largely unaffected by the change in the school leaving 
age because they would have stayed at school until or beyond their sixteenth birthday in 
any event. Although we had not anticipated this, it may also be the case that children 
from the least advantaged households were most likely to defy the new legislation and 
leave school at 15 or younger, leaving those in the middle of the distribution to gain the 
most.  
To formally test these effects we fit the multinomial logit model in equation (1). 
Table II presents the parameter estimates for this model, confirming the well established 
fact that qualification attainment is strongly related to social background. For example, 
the odds of children in quintile 1 reporting no qualifications in 2001 are 16 times greater 
than for those in quintile 5 (the base category), while individuals in quintile 5 are 
significantly more likely than any other quintile group to attain a level 4 or level 5 
qualification. Similarly, those in the middle of the socio-economic origin distribution are 
most likely to attain ‘mid-ranking’ qualifications, with quintile 2 having the highest odds 
of reporting level 1 to 3 qualifications as their highest level of attainment.  
 
TABLE II HERE 
 
The coefficient for the RoSLA dummy confirms that the reform had a substantial 
effect on raising educational attainment, with the odds of ‘no qualifications’ and ‘other 
qualifications’ as the highest qualification approximately halving, and the odds of the 
highest qualification being at Level 1 or above increasing by approximately a quarter. In 
addition to this general increase in educational attainment, the interaction terms between 
the CAMSIS quintiles and the RoSLA dummy confirm statistically what Figure I showed 
visually; that the magnitude of the attainment gain differed significantly according to the 
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social background of the cohort member. Those in quintiles 1 to 4 were significantly 
more likely to report Level 1 as their highest qualification compared to those in quintile 5 
(the base category), after the raising of the school leaving age. In other words, above and 
beyond the general increase that all individuals experienced from the education reform, 
individuals from poorer social origins, relative to the highest social origin, experienced an 
additional increase in education. Additionally, LS members from quintile 2 were more 
likely to obtain a Level 2 qualification after the reform compared to those from the top 
and the bottom of the socio-economic origin distribution. Thus, Table II shows that the 
reform not only increased educational attainment for the population as a whole but also 
resulted in a weakening of the association between attainment and socio-economic origin. 
It therefore succeeded in creating the necessary conditions for a subsequent increase in 
social fluidity, to which we turn next.viii  
 
The impact of the 1972 RoSLA on relative intergenerational social mobility 
We now turn to the reduced form model specification in equation (2) which uses the 
1972 RoSLA to estimate the effect of the exogenously induced increase in education on 
intergenerational mobility ix . The key coefficient in this equation is the interaction 
between social origin (parental CAMSIS) and the RoSLA dummy because this denotes 
the change in the intergenerational correlation for the two cohorts immediately before 
and after the school leaving age was increased.  The parameter estimates for this model 
are presented in Table III. The first three columns of Table III show estimates from 
equation (2) with CAMSIS included in continuous form for the sample as a whole, and 
then separately for men and women. Columns 4 to 6 repeat the first three models but 
with parental CAMSIS included as quintile group dummies.  
 
TABLE III HERE 
 
 
Considering models 1 to 3, in which socio-economic origin is treated as continuous, 
we find no evidence that the additional education induced by the 1972 RoSLA had any 
effect on relative intergenerational mobility. Although the interaction terms for the 
sample as a whole and for men and women separately are negative, denoting an increase 
in fluidity, they are not significantly different from zero.  However, as we saw in Table II, 
the effects of the 1972 RoSLA were differentially related to socio-economic origin, with 
those in the middle of the distribution gaining the most and those at the top gaining the 
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least. To test for nonlinearity in the effect of the reform we re-estimate equation (2) with 
parental CAMSIS score split into quintile groups.  Using this specification there is some 
suggestion that those from the middle of the socio-economic origin distribution – here 
defined as quintile groups 2 and 3 – experienced upward mobility when compared to 
quintile groups 1 and 4/5, with the interaction coefficients being positive for these 
groups and negative for the others. Again, however, none of the interactions can be 
reliably distinguished from zero.  And, moreover perhaps, even if these estimates were 
significantly greater than zero, they are still small in magnitude, indicating that the impact 
of the 1972 RoSLA reform on relative intergenerational mobility was, at most, negligible. 
Those from less advantaged socio-economic backgrounds remain considerably more 
likely to have lower occupational status in 2001 and those from more advantaged 
backgrounds maintain the highest occupational outcomes. It can thus be concluded that, 
although the education reform of 1972 increased the average length of time in education, 
reduced the proportion leaving school with no qualifications, and reduced socio-
economic inequality in educational attainment, it had no discernable effect on social 
fluidity. 
 
Discussion 
Over the course of the past 15 years, intergenerational social mobility has come to 
dominate public and political debate in a manner seldom witnessed for a concept whose 
origin lies in the academic sociological literature. Spurred by the widespread belief that 
social mobility in the UK has ‘ground to a halt’ and is lower than in comparator nations, 
politicians on both sides of the political spectrum blame one another’s historic policies 
for creating the current situation and propose remedies to improve matters in the future. 
The current government has enshrined its commitment to improving social mobility 
through the creation of a Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, with a remit of 
monitoring and reporting on progress on a range of social mobility indicators and 
holding the government’s ‘feet to the fire’ if adequate progress is not made (Child 
Poverty Act 2010). In addition to establishing this Commission, all government 
departments are now required to consider the potential impact on social mobility of any 
new policies they propose.  Increasing social mobility has thus become an archetypal 
‘valence issue’, in the sense that all parties consider it to be an important and desirable 
outcome, the only question for the electorate is, which party is managerially competent to 
deliver it (Clarke et al 2004) 
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The policy framework that has been established to produce a more socially fluid 
society is heavily dependent on educational reforms at different points in the life-course. 
The government’s ‘social mobility strategy’ seeks to improve and equalize educational 
outcomes from the early stages of infant development, through early-years, primary, and 
secondary education, and into the further and tertiary sectors (Cabinet Office 2013). As a 
key part of this agenda, the age at which young people can move from education and 
training into full-time employment was raised from 16 to 17 in 2013 and will increase 
again by an additional year in 2015. This significant change to the statutory framework of 
compulsory education is described by the government as ‘central to our ambitions to 
improve social mobility’ (HM Government 2011b).  Yet, the evidence to support the idea 
that educational expansion of this kind will deliver an increase in social mobility is, at 
best, weak.  There is a large and robust body of research which shows that educational 
attainment is strongly predictive of obtaining and maintaining socio-economic advantage 
(Devereux and Hart 2010; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). And there also exists a similarly 
robust set of findings which demonstrate that educational attainment is very strongly 
related to the socio-economic circumstances into which an individual is born (Hout, 
1988; Blanden et al. 2013). However, it is quite a leap from these empirical regularities to 
the conclusion that policies which expand the stock of education in society will 
eventually produce greater social fluidity between generations. As scholars in the 
sociological tradition have observed, social class fluidity appears to have remained 
stubbornly resistant to change during the course of the twentieth century (Boudon 1974; 
Goldthorpe et al. 1987; Goldthorpe and Mills 2004), despite the many and varied 
expansionist educational reforms that were enacted during this period (Breen 2010). 
Yet the aggregate and long-term nature of this comparison is itself rather 
unsatisfactory, for it is surely possible that specific educational reforms did have an 
impact on fluidity for particular cohorts, at particular points in time, while others did not. 
Simply observing that aggregate fluidity has not increased linearly over time does not 
preclude this possibility. Indeed, a variable impact of different educational policy reforms 
over time could well give rise to the sort of ‘trendless fluctuation’ in relative mobility 
rates that scholars have often observed (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). In this paper, we 
have sought to address this lacuna in the existing evidence base by evaluating the causal 
impact of a specific educational reform on subsequent social mobility. Focusing on the 
1972 raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16 years in England and Wales, our 
results show that the policy change succeeded in creating the minimal conditions 
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considered necessary for increasing social fluidity. That is to say, in addition to increasing 
the total stock of education in the population as a whole, the policy also equalized 
educational attainment between social class origins. This equalization effect occurred 
because those from the most advantaged backgrounds showed the smallest gain in 
attainment, while those in the middle of the socio-economic origin distribution showed 
the largest improvement. Counter to our initial expectations, the largest educational gains 
were not found amongst those from the least advantaged backgrounds. We have no 
empirical leverage on why this should have been the case, although we speculate that 
those from the least advantaged backgrounds may have disproportionately ignored the 
new legislation and left school before their sixteenth birthday.   
The new policy also changed the composition of social class groups at different 
levels of qualification attainment, with a significant increase amongst those in the middle 
of the socio-economic origini distribution obtaining level 1 and level 2 qualifications. 
This compositional change at different qualification levels also opens up the possibility 
that the reform might have resulted in greater fluidity, if the origin/destination 
association is weaker at the higher qualification level than at the levels below, which in 
this case are ‘other qualifications’ and ‘no qualifications’.  
However, even though the 1972 RoSLA established these minimal conditions for 
an increase in social fluidity, we find no evidence to suggest that it actually had such an 
effect. Although the pattern of the coefficients is suggestive of a change in fluidity as a 
result of the reform, in the sense that the groups which experienced the largest education 
gain had positive signed coefficients (indicating upward mobility) and the groups which 
experienced the smallest education gains had negative signed coefficients (indicating 
downward mobility), none was significantly different from zero. This same basic pattern 
of results is obtained when the bandwidth around the RoSLA event is altered to one and 
to three years, when the number of quantile groups is changed to four or six and when 
using log-linear models applied to the categorical Registrar General’s measure of social 
class position. The very large sample size on which our analysis is based also means that 
we can exclude the possibility that we have insufficient statistical power to reliably detect 
in our sample a substantive change in the broader population. We can, in sum, be 
confident that our results are not an artefact of research design, of measurement 
operations, or of analytical specification: the educational expansion engendered by the 
1972 reform had no effect on intergenerational social mobility. 
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 There are a number of possible reasons that might explain why this was the case. 
First, although the reform equalized educational attainment across the distribution of 
origin states, the magnitude of the change may have simply been too small to have a 
subsequent effect on the relative chances of occupational upgrading. Similarly, the 
compositional change within qualification levels may not have moved sufficient numbers 
from less advantaged backgrounds to educational levels at which the origin destination-
association is weaker.  The vast majority of the educational gain was at NVQ level 1 
(equivalent to 1-4 GCSEs at grades A-C) and a small amount at NVQ level 2 (5+ GCSEs 
or 1 A’ level) and it is possible that the intergenerational correlation at these levels is the 
same, or not appreciably lower than at the qualification levels below. A third, 
unverifiable, possibility is that the higher social class groups responded to the 
equalization of human capital and credentials by drawing more heavily on their social 
networks and accumulated cultural capital to maintain their advantage in the job market. 
Be that as it may, whatever the exact reasons for the failure of the 1972 reform to 
increase fluidity, it seems clear that expansionist education policies cannot be assumed to 
lead inevitably, or in any straightforward manner, to higher rates of intergenerational 
social mobility. And this is so, even when they succeed in engendering compositional 
change across educational levels and in equalizing the distribution of educational 
attainment across social class groups. Policy-makers would be well advised to remember 
this fact when designing, implementing, and justifying expansionist educational policies 
in the future.  
 
Notes 
1 Some children could leave at age 15 if their birthday was in June, July or August. 
1 In Scotland the minimum school leaving age was raised three years later on 1 September 1975. We 
therefore exclude Scotland from the following analysis and when referring to UK only include England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland in this definition. 
1 The 2011 census has now been linked but does not form a part of this analysis.  
1 The National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) is not available for the 1971 wave of the 
LS. A version of NS-SEC is available for subsequent waves, although this is not based on the full set of 
questions.  
1 Specification checks show that our results are not sensitive to using 3 or 6 quantile groups. 
1 The ONS-LS data does not include month of birth and children born in September have more schooling 
that those born in August due to school intake laws.   
1 Which is represented by a series of five parental CAMSIS origin dummy variables.   
1 We tested these results by gender and found no evidence of statistically significant differences  
1 As mentioned previously, our CAMSIS measure of occupational prestige is standardised every census 
with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 15 and we therefore inherently measure relative 
intergenerational mobility. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table I: ONS-LS highest qualification descriptors  
NVQ Code Qualifications covered Descriptor
Level 0 No academic or professional qualifications Basic general knowledge. No official 
qualifications
Level 1 CSEs (grades 2-5), GCSEs (grades D-G), 1-4 CSEs 
(grade 1), 1-4 GCSEs (grades A-C), 1-4 O levels, NVQ 
level 1, Foundation GNVQ
Basic factual knowledge of a field of work 
or study. 'Poor' lower secondary school 
qualifications
Level 2 5+O levels, 5+CSEs (grade1), 5+GCSEs (grades A-C) 
etc., 1 A level, 1-3 AS levels, NVQ level 2, 
Intermediate GNVQ
Knowledge of facts, principles, processes 
and general concepts, in a field of work or 
study. 'Good' lower secondary school or 
'poor' upper secondary school 
qualifications
Level 3 2+ A levels, 4+ AS levels, Higher School Certificate, 
NVQ level 3, Advanced GNVQ
Factual and theoretical knowledge in broad 
contexts within a field of work or study. 
'Good' upper secondary school 
qualifications
Level 4/5 First degree, Higher degree, NVQ levels 4-5, HNC, 
HND. Qualified Teacher status, Qualified Medical 
Doctor, Qualified Dentist, Qualified Nurse, Midwife, 
Health Visitor
Comprehensive, specialised, factual and 
theoretical knowledge within a field of 
work or study. All higher education degrees 
including vocational degrees
Other qualifications/ 
level unknown:
 Other qualifications (e.g. City and Guilds, RSA, BTEC, 
etc.), Other Professional qualifications
Unknown or other qualifications which 
cannot be classified  
 
Table II: Multinomial logit model predicting highest qualification in 2001 by origin 
quintile  
No Qual Other Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4/5
Quintile 1 16.588*** 7.829*** 3.704*** 2.251*** 1.399* ref
(1.763) (1.063) (0.377) (0.228) (0.205) ref
Quintile 2 13.255*** 6.879*** 3.751*** 2.455*** 1.510** ref
(1.409) (0.937) (0.374) (0.241) (0.212) ref
Quintile 3 7.028*** 5.438*** 2.936*** 2.179*** 1.395* ref
(0.729) (0.712) (0.275) (0.196) (0.179) ref
Quintile 4 2.910*** 2.199*** 1.597*** 1.476*** 1.023 ref
(0.309) (0.307) (0.149) (0.127) (0.127) ref
Quintile 5 ref ref ref ref ref ref
base category ref ref ref ref ref ref
0.583*** 0.454*** 1.252* 1.222* 1.218 ref
(0.073) (0.079) (0.104) (0.086) (0.122) ref
Quintile 1 1.253 1.214 1.409** 1.126 1.111 ref
(0.217) (0.270) (0.180) (0.185) (0.219) ref
Quintile 2 1.211 1.241 1.319* 1.343* 0.962 ref
(0.193) (0.274) (0.176) (0.150) (0.183) ref
Quintile 3 1.270 1.189 1.318* 1.243 1.051 ref
(0.201) (0.259) (0.179) (0.154) (0.184) ref
Quintile 4 1.114 1.309 1.346* 1.187 1.104 ref
(0.183) (0.301) (0.166) (0.139) (0.184) ref
Quintile 5 ref ref ref ref ref ref
base category ref ref ref ref ref ref
Obs
Parental Origin 
dummy 
variables 
(CAMSIS Score 
1971)
1972 RoSLA 
dummy
Parental Origin 
dummy 
variables 
(CAMSIS Score 
1971) x 1972 
RoSLA dummy
18262
Dependent variable = Child education outcomes in 2001
Source: ONS-LS limited to those born in 1955, 1956, 1958 and 1959. Coefficients are odds ratios (standard 
errors in parentheses). Controls include parental age and regional dummies. 
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Table III: OLS regressions of intergenerational mobility – the effect of 1972 RoSLA 
Child CAMSIS score in 2001 All Men Women All Men Women
Parental CAMSIS score in 1971
Continuous 0.300*** 0.305*** 0.296***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Dummy variables
Quintile 1 -11.856*** -11.755*** -11.964***
(0.416) (0.591) (0.584)
Quintile 2 -10.406*** -11.171*** -9.737***
(0.416) (0.592) (0.583)
Quintile 3 -7.867*** -8.253*** -7.541***
(0.412) (0.585) (0.578)
Quintile 4 -3.617*** -3.972*** -3.375***
(0.427) (0.617) (0.591)
Quintile 5 ref ref ref
base category ref ref ref
1972 RoSLA reform 0.691 0.808 0.579 0.326 0.190 0.457
(0.620) (0.885) (0.865) (0.398) (0.561) (0.564)
Parental CAMSIS score in 1971 x 
1972 RoSLA reform
Continuous -0.010 -0.011 -0.009
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
Dummy variables
Quintile 1 -0.204 -0.238 -0.216
(0.573) (0.816) (0.802)
Quintile 2 0.433 0.980 -0.013
(0.572) (0.812) (0.803)
Quintile 3 0.057 0.097 0.051
(0.568) (0.806) (0.799)
Quintile 4 -0.352 -0.288 -0.418
(0.586) (0.839) (0.818)
Quintile 5 ref ref ref
base category ref ref ref
Parent age controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 15.401*** 9.860* 20.767*** 35.847 31.456 40.243
3.023875 4.267255 4.271663 (3.045) (4.300) (4.300)
Observations 22008 10833 11175 22008 10833 11175
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.117 0.113 0.120 0.110
Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Source: ONS-LS Subsample of 2001 
sample members were born in 1955, 1956, 1958 and 1959. 
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Figure I: The effect of the 1972 RoSLA on qualification attainment by social origin 
quintile  
  
Source: Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study  
 
                                                 
i Some children could leave at age 15 if their birthday was in June, July or August. 
ii In Scotland the minimum school leaving age was raised three years later on 1 September 1975. We 
therefore exclude Scotland from the following analysis and when referring to UK only include England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland in this definition. 
iii The 2011 census has now been linked but does not form a part of this analysis.  
iv The National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) is not available for the 1971 wave of the 
LS. A version of NS-SEC is available for subsequent waves, although this is not based on the full set of 
questions.  
v Specification checks show that our results are not sensitive to using 3 or 6 quantile groups. 
vi The ONS-LS data does not include month of birth and children born in September have more schooling 
that those born in August due to school intake laws.   
vii Which is represented by a series of five parental CAMSIS origin dummy variables.   
viii We tested these results by gender and found no evidence of statistically significant differences  
ix As mentioned previously, our CAMSIS measure of occupational prestige is standardised every census 
with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 15 and we therefore inherently measure relative 
intergenerational mobility. 
